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Abstract 
For a long time, there has been uncertainty and 
uneasiness regarding the application of competition law 
in the digital ecosystem. It is only recently that the 
evolving Indian competition regime has started facing 
some of these concerns. In the light of the Competition 
Commission of India‟s (CCI) recent encounter with the 
search-technology giant Google, the paper provides a 
much needed analysis of the watershed judgment, 
considering the likely effects it will have on future 
competition law jurisprudence. CCI has for the first time, 
by comprehensively analysing the interplay of antitrust 
laws and tech market, laid down the basic ground work 
for subsequent cases. The paper begins with probing into 
the logic and rationale given by CCI in assessing the 
relevant market, and Google‟s dominant position in such 
relevant market. Later, the paper examines if the unique 
features of digital markets have been incorporated, while 
analyzing Google‟s specialized search designs, namely 
Universal Results, OneBoxes and Commercial Units. 
Drawing attention to some key concerns like the lack of 
evidence-based analysis by CCI, the paper concludes by 
suggesting a suitable remedy and summarizing the key 
takeaways from the discourse. 
Keywords: Abuse of dominance, Antitrust, Competition 
Commission of India, Digital economy, Google search bias 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, Google‟s activities have brought it under the scrutiny of 
thecompetition regulators of various jurisdictions.1 Theinformation 
filed under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act) 
by Consim Info Private Limited and Consumer Unity and Trust 
Society, triggered the onset of investigation against Google, by the 
Indian competition watchdog. The world‟s largest search engine, 
Google, has been fined INR 135.86 Crores by the CCI, for abusing 
its dominant position.2 The CCI ruling3 is a first of its kind in that it 
showcases CCI‟s exchange with a technology giant having 
considerable influence in the digital space. 
The three transgressions for which Google has been held liable are: 
first, pre-determined display of Universal Results at the first, fourth 
or tenth position on the Search Engine Results Page (SERP); second, 
the prominent placement and allocation of disproportionate real 
estate to the commercial flight unit on SERP4; and thirdly, the 
restrictive conditions imposed on advertisers through the 
intermediation agreements. This paper will discuss in detail the 
concerns surrounding the issue of Google‟s search engine bias case.  
The term „new economy‟ is often used to describe sectors of the 
economy that produce or intensely use new technologies, with an 
increasing dependence on computers, telecommunications and the 
Internet.5 Big technology companies known for disruptive 
                                                          
1 Geetanjali Sharma, Competition law and E-Commerce: Emerging 
Trends, Vol. 1 Issue 3, ICLR, 13, 5-15 (2016) http:// 
www.iclr.in/assets/pdf/ICLR%20Volume%201%20(First%20Article).pdf.  
2 ET Bureau, Google told to pay Rs 135.86 crore fine for abusing its power in 
India, (New Delhi, Mumbai)(February 09, 2018) https:// 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/cci-issues-order-against-
google-for-search-bias/articleshow/62838992.cms (last accessed on April 
04, 2018). 
3 Matrimony.Com Limited vs Google Llc& Others, CCI, Case Nos. 07 and 
30, 2012 (hereinafter Case Nos. 07 and 30 of 2012). 
4Id. 
5 Government of Canada, Economic Concepts, Glossary of statistical terms 
(August 26, 2004)  https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6267 
(last accessed on April 02, 2018)  
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innovations are not free from acquisition and abuse of market 
power.6  Antitrust assessments of online services and search 
engines are challenging because of network effects, economies of 
scale, immense product innovation and fierce competition. Google 
differs from other information providers as there is no clear 
benchmark against which to evaluate the quality of the search 
results it provides. The evolving Indian competition framework has 
taken a novel approach in addressing the issues concerned with 
Google‟s search bias. The paper in the next section illustrates how 
the Indian antitrust watchdog has cleared the clouds of uncertainty 
enveloping the administration of competition law,into a New 
Economy. 
2. The Case against Google      
2.1.Relevant Market 
2.1.1. Relevant Product Market 
With regard to the plea of non-applicability of Section 4 to the 
present case, CCIheld that users offer indirect consideration to 
Google by providing their eyeballs to the SERP, and allowing 
Google to collect and use their informationgives the tech giant a 
huge competitive advantage against most other companies. Both 
these acts facilitate generation of revenue by Google as it attracts 
more advertisers. Besides, the revenue earned by search platforms 
through provision of search based advertisement services negates 
the view that search services offered by such platforms are free. 
CCI modeled a neoteric approach in recognizing that assessment of 
only one of the two sides of Google‟s business models, would lead 
to a biased and distorted picture of reality. CCI opined that 
submissions made by Google were ignorant and missed the role 
and nature of big data, which in the present case is the aggregate of 
eyeballs and the choices made by the users. In view of the above, 
                                                          
6 Smriti Parsheera, Ajay Shah and Avirup Bose, Competition Issues in 
India‟s Online Economy, NIPFP Working paper series No. 194, (2017), 
http://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2017/04/WP_2017_194.p
df. (last accessed on April 16, 2018). 
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CCI discarded Google‟s plea and held that online search falls 
within the ambit of section 4 of the Act. 
In taking a view concurring to the Director General‟s (DG) findings, 
that online general web search services are not alternative to site-
specific search and specialized search services, CCI relied on factors 
like variations in terms of characteristics, intended use, price etc.7 
Also, the CCI found no reason to differ with the analysis of the DG 
and agreed that online general web search services cannot be 
substituted with direct search option by typing URL of websites in 
the internet browsers. 
In regard to the issue of search and non-search advertising, CCI 
noted that search advertising helped advertisers in targeting 
specific users. Typically, search advertisements are used for 
demand fulfillment, while non-search advertisements are for brand 
awareness or recognition.8 For this reason, both the advertisements 
are priced using different pricing mechanisms. In view of the 
aforesaid, the CCI held online search advertising services to be a 
distinct relevant product market, in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 2(s) read with Section 19(7) of the Act.9 
2.1.2.Relevant Geographic Market 
CCI‟s stance was in consonance with the findings of the Office of 
DG. The Commission reasoned that since CCI is concerned with the 
market only in India, the relevant geographical market in case of 
online general web search services were to be limited to 
India.CCIalso approved the factors considered by the DG, when 
defining the relevant geographical market. Consequently, it held 
India to be the relevant geographic market for online search 
advertising services in accordance with the terms of Section 2(t) 
read with Section 19(6) of the Act.10As a result, CCI determined the 
following two relevant markets in the present case for examining 
the alleged abusive conduct of Google: First, the Market for Online 
                                                          
7§2(t), The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, Acts of Parliament, 2003 
(India) 
8 Case Nos. 07 and 30 of 2012, para 98. 
9Id. at para 94. 
10Id. at para 100. 
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General Web Search Services in India and second, the Market for 
Online Search Advertising Services in India. 
2.1.3. Analysis 
The manner in which the relevant market is determined decides 
whether the companies ultimately face antitrust liability or not.11 
CCI has aptly taken into its purview the unique features of digital 
markets, when determining the relevant market. This is believed to 
be true because, CCI in this judgment deviated from its 
antagonistic approach of holding online platforms and the off-line 
traditional brokers, as part of the same relevant market.12 Such an 
approach was endorsed by the CCI in a case filed by the Real Estate 
Brokers‟ Association of India against online platforms like 
Magicbricks, 99acres and Housing.com.13 CCI, in holding online 
and offline markets as separate, has provided important 
perspective. 
Furthermore, the relevant market definition for Internet-based 
businesses is dependent on an assessment of whether brick-and-
mortar substitutes are available for the given product or service.14 
However, digital markets make it exhausting to outline the relevant 
market, because the product or service being dealt with by internet 
businesses is „information‟ and not some corporeal commodity. 
CCI has adopted the principle of relying on the geographic 
locations of the individuals using Internet to define the geographic 
market.15 Hence, the CCI has embraced a visionary approach 
fordefining markets in a way that captures the probable effects of 
competition.  
                                                          
11See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Failure to identify a relevant market is a proper ground for dismissing a 
[monopolization] claim.”). 
12Ashish Ahuja v. Snapdeal.com, Case No. 17, 2014,CCI; See also Mr. 
Deepak Verma v. Clues Network Pvt. Ltd, CCI, Case No. 34, 2016. 
13 Confederation of Real Estate Brokers‟ Association of India v. 
Magicbricks.com and others, Case No. 23, 2016, CCI at para 11. 
14Supra note 9. 
15 Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858 (E.D. Va. 
1999) (quoting Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 
456, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
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2.2. Assessment of Dominance: An Analysis 
How one determines whether and to what extent market power 
exists in particular circumstances is an important issue.16 By virtue 
of explanation (a) to Section 4 of the Act, „dominant position‟ 
means a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the 
relevant market, which enables it to operate independently of 
competitive forces.In the new economy, neither the market share is 
sufficient in itself to dictate dominance17, nor can the threshold be 
wisely fixed to establish dominance. The Commission relied on the 
empirical data submitted by the DG in this regard. This comprised 
of Google‟s significantly high market share in the sphere of online 
general web search in India, as well as on global basis. The 
Commission also acceded to take into consideration Google‟s 
revenue earned by the AdWords (services used by advertisers for 
online promotion of their content, brand, and website18) and 
AdSense programs in the relevant market, while deciding upon 
Google‟s dominance.19 It observed that the significant barriers to 
entry and Google‟s scale benefit reinforced the effect of Google‟s 
high market shares in establishing Google‟s dominance in the 
online general web search and search advertising markets.20The 
Commission recognized that in seeking to understand whether 
Google is dominant in the relevant market or not, the question that 
should be addressed is whether Google would lose market share 
materially, if it were to reduce innovation. This was answered in 
the negative, for the reason that it was highly unlikely that a large 
number of users would switch to a competing search engine in a 
                                                          
16 Michal S GAL, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies, 
Harvard University Press (2009). 
17 Dominance does not exist in the abstract, but in relation to a particular 
market. See Case 6/72 Continental Can v. Commission; See also United 
Brands v. Commission, European Court Reports 1978 -00207; L‟Oréal v. 
PVBA De Nieuwe, Case 31/80 [1980] ECR 3775, [1981] 2 CMLR 235. 
18Business News: Analytics, Definition of ‘AdWords’, 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/adwords (last 
Accessed on 02 December, 2018).  
19 Case Nos. 07 and 30 of 2012 at para 115. 
20Id. at para 117. 
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short or medium term, even if Google reduced the quality and 
innovation of its services. 
CCI rejected Google‟s claim of Facebook posing threat to Google‟s 
position, as an upcoming competitor in the online advertising 
market. As the relevant market for Google includes online search 
advertising services only, Facebook and other entities engaged in 
non-search and display advertising, were not Google‟s competitors 
in the search advertising market. CCI also recognized Google‟s 
significant head start in crawling and indexing of data, which gave 
Google aninsurmountable scale advantage. As only market 
participants in the online general web search market can compete 
in the search advertising market, the barriers in the online general 
web search market also effectively restrict entry into the search 
advertising market.In multi sided high technology markets, 
innovation is the key and market shares therefore should be 
transient. Due to disruptive cycles of innovation, last year‟s winner 
could quickly become this year‟s nobody. However, Google‟s 
consistently high market shares suggested, that it has got other 
advantages, besides technical advantages, which insulate its market 
position. In view of this, the Commission had no hesitation in 
holding that Google was dominant in both the relevant markets. 
Antitrust issues in digital frameworks require special focus on the 
dynamic effects that come up when assessing cyber entities. These 
dynamic effects may include changes in quality, innovation and 
efficiency.21 Identifying factors other than market share in 
ascertaining Google‟s position, underlines the prudent and 
foresighted outlook adopted by the Commission. Google‟s role as 
the gatekeeper of the information on internet, to majority of the 
users in India, weakens Google‟s case.22 Moreover since revenue 
                                                          
21 Dr. Maria Maher, Paul Reynolds, Paul Muysert and Dr. Fred 
Wandschneider, Executive Summary, Resetting competition policy 
frameworks for the digital ecosystem , (October 2016), 
https://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/GSMA_Resetting-Competition_Report_Oct-
2016_60pp_WEBv2.pdf. 
22See Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Google, CHI. TRIB. 1, (Apr. 6, 2012), at 
19, http://artictes.chicagotribune.comV20l2-04-06/news/ct-perspec-0405-
bork-20120406-1 unpaidsearch-results-search-engines-search-algorithms. 
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from advertising, whichis the lifeblood of most web pages, is tied 
to a website's traffic, Google is in a position to decide whose 
content flourishes and whose flounders.23 Going by the number of 
competitors to determine dominance, Google faces opposition from 
just two other search engines- Bing and Yahoo.24 CCI has exhibited 
the much required technological acumen in its assessment of the 
case. 
Google‟s defenders argue that competition is just one click away 
and people have full liberty to explore search engines other than 
Google, but they forget that most people believe the first item they 
see as the most relevant listing. Relevance is a slippery and 
subjective concept and it is not the same for every person.25  The 
source of Google‟s power lies in the inability of those who engage 
in searches,to evaluate the relevancy of search results. This is due to 
the trust reposed by them in Google‟s ability to sort the most 
relevant content. This led CCI to hold Google as a dominant entity 
in the concerned market.  
The reasons laid down by CCI in declaring Google as dominant are 
strikingly similar, to the line of reasoning endorsed by the 
European Union (EU) in the famous Google Comparison Shopping 
decision. The European Commission (EC) had concluded Google to 
be dominant across the whole European Economic Area, owing to 
its consistently high market share, barriers to entry and the 
deleterious network effects.26 Furthermore, Google‟s standing as a 
                                                          
23See Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing 3, (Statement of Sen. 
Michael S. Lee, "Given its dominant position, most internet-based 
businesses rely on Google for a substantial share of their traffic in 
revenues."). 
24SeeCarolanne Mangles, Search Engine Statistics 2018, (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.smartinsights.com/search-engine-marketing/search-
engine-statistics/ (last accessed on April 13, 2018). 
25See Geoffrey A. Manne and Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality Is the 
Answer What's the Question? 7 Int'l Ctr. for Law & Economics White Paper 
Series, (2011) https://laweconcenter.org/ images/ articles/ 
search_neutrality_manne_wright_final.pdf.  
26 European Commission - Press release, Antitrust: Commission fines 
Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving 
illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service, (June 27, 2017) 
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dominant entity has been cemented in the Google-Android 
operating system case, wherein the entity was pronounced to be 
dominant in the markets for general internet search services, 
licensable smart mobile operating systems and app stores for the 
Android mobile operating system.27 Third in the series is Google 
AdSense Advertising case, which is expected to be conclusively 
determined and rolled out in 2019. In its preliminary statement of 
objections to Google, the EC has determined Google to be a 
dominant enterprise, again, due to its unfailingly high market 
share.28 
The preceding trilogy of cases underlines how the EU has handled 
the issue of ascertaining the dominance of enterprises thriving in 
digital markets. It is believed thatthe outlook of CCI may have been 
impracticable and stretched over and beyond conventional 
determinants of assessing dominance, such as the market share of 
enterprises, while maintaining conformity with the leading 
competition jurisdictions.  
2.3. Search Bias 
Having perused the DG‟s findings and Google‟s submissions, CCI 
went on to examine if the specific allegations made against Google 
concerning its abuse of dominance hold up or not.  
2.3.1. Universal Results 
Universal Results refers to the blending of additional media for a 
specific type of information, such as news and images, with the 
organic results for an enhanced search experience.The contention of 
Google that „its systems were not sufficiently advanced to conduct 
                                                                                                                                    
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm. (last accessed 
on April 09, 2018). 
27 European Commission - Press release, Antitrust: Commission fines 
Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding Android mobile devices 
to strengthen dominance of Google's search engine, (July 20, 2018) 
28 European Commission - Press release: Antitrust: Commission takes 
further steps in investigations alleging Google's comparison shopping and 
advertising-related practices breach EU rules, (July 21, 2018) 
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a relevance comparison for all positions on the result page‟29 was 
disallowed by CCI in the absence of concrete material to support it. 
Moreover, Google gave no satisfactory reasons for limiting the 
display of Universal Results to the fixed positions. The Commission 
found that rankings of Universal Results prior to 2010 were not 
strictly determined by relevance, but instead were pre-determined. 
CCI held that the practice of displaying Universal Results on fixed 
positions was unfair, as it created a misleading façade that such 
search results were appearing based on their relevance. This was 
held to be a violation of Section (4)(2)(a)(i) of the Act. 
2.3.2.OneBoxes 
OneBox is a specially delineated box which appears within 
Universal Results, highlighting news, images and videos. The 
intent behind displaying OneBox is to give the user information 
directly from Google, without having to move to any other site. 
CCI observed that OneBoxes provide short factual answers to the 
user‟s query. Queries relating to mathematics, stock quotes, local 
time, currency conversion, and weather, have one possible answer, 
which OneBox provides. The CCI found DG‟s observation of there 
being bias in the sources that Google selects for OneBoxes‟ content, 
not backed by evidence. Mere possibility that it may not select the 
most relevant provider, is not a substitute for actual evidence of 
bias. DG‟s concern that Google‟s OneBoxes do not select the most 
relevant answer is mistaken because,OneBoxes respond to queries 
for which there is only one canonical or factual answer. In that case, 
the question does not arise as to which content provider gave the 
most relevant answer.Furthermore, the fact that Google receives no 
payment from the content providers for showcasing their content 
on OneBoxes, gives Google no reason to choose an inferior source 
of information. Google has also pointed out that it monitors and 
evaluates the content providers on an ongoing basis, to decide 
whether to renew a content agreement with the same provider or 
select a different provider. Further, no evidence of Google selecting 
an inferior information provider was presented by the DG. All 
things considered, CCI declared the conclusions drawn by the DG 
qua OneBox, as not made out. 
                                                          
29 Case Nos. 07 and 30 of 2012 at para 30. 
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2.3.3.Commercial Units 
Commercial Units are search results that Google sets apart in ad 
space, with a label indicating them as „Sponsored‟. CCI found that 
Google allotted a disproportionately high estate to sponsored 
results on SERP. This prominent placement of Commercial Units 
served two purposes- it allowed Google to steer people to its own 
pages and not to third party websites and the conspicuous 
positioning of Google Flights page above the ten blue links, helped 
Google gain advertisement revenue, by denying the key real estate 
to third party verticals. Therefore, CCI found that such partisan 
division of traffic by Google, pushed competing verticals down and 
out of user‟s eyesight.  
CCI held that Google‟s public claim of ranking results based on 
relevance had a huge impact on clicking behavior of users. CCI 
even highlighted excerpts from, first, Google‟s 2004 Initial Public 
Offerings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
where Google made the statement, “We will do our best to provide 
the most relevant and useful search results possible, independent 
of financial incentives. Our search results will be objective and we 
will not accept payment for inclusion or ranking in them30”,second, 
the letter accompanying the IPO filing made by Google‟s founders 
where they stated “Our search results are the best we know how to 
produce. They are unbiased and objective, and we do not accept 
payment for them or for inclusion or more frequent updating.31”, 
and third, Google‟s Executive Chairman, Eric Schmidt‟s statements 
“the natural search answers [are] completely unbiased with respect 
to economics.”32 In all three above mentioned instances, Google 
                                                          
30 Google‟s registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Prospectus summary, (August 18, 2004) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/0001193125041433
77/d424b4.htm (last accessed on April 05, 2018). 
31Google‟s registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Letter from the Founders “An Owner‟s Manual” for 
Google‟s Shareholders, (August 18, 2004) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/0001193125041433
77/d424b4.htm (last accessed on April 05, 2018). 
32 National Public Radio, CEO: Google Knows A Lot About You, Then 
Forgets, (October 02, 2009) https://www.npr.org/ 2009/ 10/ 02/ 
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had publicly claimed that its results are “unbiased and objective”. 
These public pronouncements have a huge impact on user‟s 
clicking behavior. Hence, the users were deceived and misled 
whenever Google treated Commercial Units in a preferential and 
biased manner. 
The Commission also observed that such prominent placement of 
commercial units on SERP could give rise to yet another anti-trust 
concern. Luring consumers to search for more flights on the Google 
Flight page, allowed Google to collect more user data to reinforce 
its advantage in search advertising market. The user data that 
Google was able to collect did not allow other competing vertical 
search pages the same benefit and deteriorated their ability to 
further innovate on their products. Thus, CCI found it impossible 
to deny that Google was leveraging its dominant position in 
General Web Search, to provide gateway for users to find relevant 
travel verticals. The crux of the matter lies in the reduced visibility 
given to equally efficient websites, due to which they are unable to 
sustain and survive in the market for flight search services. The 
Commission had no hesitation in holding that Google, through its 
search design, had not only placed its commercial units right at a 
prominent position on SERP, but had also allocated 
disproportionate real estate thereof to those units resulting into 
pushing down or pushing out of the verticals, who were 
attempting to gain market access. This conduct of Google, which is 
an unfair imposition upon the users of general search services, is in 
contravention of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act.33 
2.3.4. Analysis 
CCI displayed a pro-innovation stance in recognizing product 
design as an integral dimension of competition. The majority view 
showcased adoption of a stringent and bold approach in holding 
Google, in violation of law, for an act which had been remedied by 
Google, approximately two years prior to the date of filing of 
information. The dissenting judges endorsed a different rationale 
for their stand. Concerning Universal Results, it was opined that 
                                                                                                                                    
113450803/ceo-google-knows-a-lot-about-you-then-forgets (last accessed 
on April 05, 2018). 
33 Case Nos. 07 and 30 of 2012 at para 253. 
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the changes in the system brought about by Google post 2010 
obviate the need for any regulatory intervention, especially when 
the new fully–floating regime appropriately addresses the 
concern.34 They stated that persecution of Google with respect to its 
historic use of fixed positions for Universal Results on SERP, was 
uncalled for. However, this standpoint is susceptible to criticism, 
because it ignores the „special responsibility‟ that Google as a 
dominant enterprise in the digital space, is bound to abide by. This 
unfavorable decision comes as a reminder to all dominant entities, 
of their fallibility. Super dominant firms like Google are not 
expected to take unfair advantage of their position, as such abusive 
conduct, not only impacts the market as a whole, but may also 
affect the entry and sustenance of other market participants into 
complementary markets. 
Attending to the issue of display of Commercial Units at a 
prominent place on SERP, the minority view was of the opinion 
that penalizing an enterprise on account ofhypotheticalframeworks 
built on perceived premises would be inappropriate and 
unseemly.The lack of statistical data to support findings against 
Google was highly instrumental with the dissent of two minority 
judges. Although the findings made by the DG may prima facie 
persuade one into believing in Google‟s indulgence in abuse of its 
dominant position, such findings, in the absence of robust data and 
evidence remain mere conjectures. Allegations need the backing of 
empirical data, before they materialize into a water tight case.  
Understanding European Union‟s approach in dealing with 
Google, will allow us to have a better perspective in this regard. In 
imposing a fine on Google, EU had collected and extensively 
evaluated a large bundle of evidence35, includinga) significant 
quantities of real-world data including 5.2 Terabytes of actual 
search results from Google (around 1.7 billion search queries).36b) 
                                                          
34 Dissent Note dated 08.02.2018 in Case Nos. 07 and 30 of 2012 at para 31. 
35 European Commission - Press release, Antitrust: Commission fines 
Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving 
illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service, (June 27, 2017) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm. (last accessed 
on April 09, 2018). 
36Id. 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 8, No.1                              ISSN 2278-4322 
 
50 
 
experiments and surveys, analyzing in particular the impact of 
visibility in search results on consumer behaviour and click-
through rates.37c) a comprehensive analysis of questionnaires 
which EU had addressed to several hundred companies.38 
The aforementioned facts indicate the substantial reliance of the 
European competition framework on statistical data, when 
investigating potential violations of the law. The dissenting opinion 
running on similar lines show contempt for penalizing Google in 
the absence of sufficient data. The author is of the opinion that in 
such a case, directing the DG to conduct further investigation or 
pursuing an inquiry on its own39, would have been the better 
choice. 
Moving to an economic forefront, the probe into Google and its 
mechanics brings to light, the glaring dissimilarities between the 
argumentation followed by the Indian Competition Commission 
and the United States‟ Federal Trade Commission (US FTC). US 
FTC, to an extent, untangled the conundrum surrounding the 
interface of competition with technology, in the Matter of Google 
Inc.40 Contrary to the findings made by CCI, FTC came out with a 
finding favourable for Google and absolved it from liability, subject 
to monitoring of the actions of Google. It is amply clear from the 
language used by the FTC that the favourable order stemmed from 
its extensive reliance on the Chicago school of thought. The 
Chicago school emulates that the primary goal of competition law 
is the betterment and advancement of the consumers, irrespective 
of the actions undertaken being anticompetitive. A cursory perusal 
of the order by FTC will divulge that the bench considered 
                                                          
37Id. 
38Id. 
39§26(7), The Competition Act, 2002, Act No. 12 of 2003, Acts of 
Parliament, 2002 (India). 
40 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google‟s Search 
Practices, (January 03, 2013) https://www.ftc.gov/ sites/ default/ 
files/documents/public_statements/statement-commission-regarding-
googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf (last accessed 
on June 08, 2018) 
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Google‟s biased results „as an improvement in the overall quality of 
Google‟s search product‟.41 
On the other end of the spectrum, lies the Harvard school of 
thought, which has the countenance of both the CCI and the EC. 
The Harvard school dictates that all anticompetitive activities are 
inherently presumed to be illegal heedless of the alleviating effects 
of such activities on consumers. As is evident from the concerned 
rulings, the import of Chicago school is discounted in favour of the 
competition oriented Harvard school of thought. This is because, in 
spite of appreciating the benefits incurring from Google‟s biased 
results, the entity was heavily penalized for stifling competition. 
3. Possible Remedies 
3.1. Need for Intervention 
There has been much dialogue relating to the upcoming role of 
competition authorities in ensuring that the internet based 
businesses function within a competitive framework. Typically, 
there are two factions endorsing their respective views regarding 
the optimal competition policy. 
i. The Schumpeterian Idea of Creative Destruction 
Joseph Schumpeter, professor at Harvard University, coined 
the term „creative destruction‟42. One of the most influential 
economists of the 20th Century, Schumpeter propounded 
that there is tremendous possibility of a periodic paradigm 
shift in internet economies, which do not allow a once 
dominant business to maintain its preeminence for a long 
period. In the era of New Economy, there is constant fear of 
being overthrown by a new innovation, due to rapid 
technological changes. Such a scenario does not call for 
government intervention because the tempo at which 
decisions are made by competition authorities and the 
technical know-how at hand, is not sufficient to assess the 
                                                          
41Id. 
42 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism, and democracy, 3 New York: 
Harper Perennial (1950). 
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competition issues in these avant-garde fast-moving 
sectors.43 The incongruence between law time - time taken 
by authorities in deciding a case, and internet time, results 
in the findings to become extraneous.44 Superfluous 
intervention may even harm the users as well as the 
competition by chilling innovation. 
ii. Traditional Assessment 
The traditional or conventional view of competition 
assessment is the most commonly adopted framework by 
any competition authority. When looking at New Economy, 
features like economies of scale, network effects and the 
possibility of consumers being locked-into a particular 
network become the exigent factors to be paid heed to, for 
active competition enforcement. In general, this approach 
involves the identification of the relevant market, 
establishing whether the firm in question is a dominant 
player in that market, and then an assessment of whether 
there has been an abuse of dominance. 
3.2.A Viable Remedy 
If the existence of such a bias by any search service provider could 
be proven, finding an adequate remedy that does not affect the 
competitive structure of the industry is challenging. While 
commitment made by search engines not to engage in search bias 
may help maintain the status quo, augmented interventionist 
measures such as watching over generation of search results with a 
view to ensure objectivity, may well reduce their quality.45A 
plethora of remedial measures such as search neutrality, doing 
away with Universal Results, and continuous disclosure of changes 
made to the algorithms, have been suggested by numerous 
                                                          
43Supra note 5. 
44Avirup Bose and Smriti Parsheera, Network Effects in India’s Online 
Businesses: A Competition Law Analysis, (Sept 30, 2016), 
http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/2017_pa14_pa2.pdf.  
45DikerVanberg, A, „From Archie to Google -Search engine providers and 
emergent challenges in relation to EU competition law‟, 3 EJLT (2012), 
http://ejlt.org/article/view/115/198.  
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academicians to redress the situation. Nevertheless, each suggested 
remedy suffers from some lacunae. This warrants for a search of an 
alternative remedy like commitments made by accused parties to 
resolve issues quickly and efficiently.  
3.2.1. Search Neutrality as remedy 
This remedy requires Google to use „neutral‟ search algorithms and 
display search results in an „even-handed‟ manner.46 In view of the 
transition from ten blue links model, to a model where ultimate 
information sought itself is displayed, search neutrality as a 
principle is incongruous. Further, the employment of search 
neutrality solely by Google, owing to its dominance in the market, 
is irrational. Such an application of search neutrality will handicap 
Google from investing in further research and development of 
search engines.  Furthermore, it is contrary to the very idea of 
search engines which is to „discriminate‟between the results, to 
provide a list of the most relevant sites.47Thus, the future of search 
neutrality as a broad principle that produces search result rankings 
based on some „unbiased‟ metric of relevance,48 is both impractical 
and unattainable. 
3.2.2. Ten blue links, as opposed touniversal search as remedy 
Another alternative suggested to protect competition in digital 
economy was to forbid Google from incorporating Universal 
Results, along with the organic results. This would essentially 
mean Google reverting back to its decade old arrangement of 
displaying ten blue links. This will alleviate Google‟s competitors, 
but separating general and specialized search will come at the 
                                                          
46 Marvin Ammori and Luke Pelican, Why Search Bias Claims Against 
Google Don't Hold Up, (June 7, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/06/07/why-search-bias-
claims-against-google-dont-hold-up/#eb5ac06f7faa. 
47Id. 
48See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine 
Utopianism, 8 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 188, 189 (2006). 
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https:
//www.google.co.in/&httpsredir=1&article=1112&context=facpubs. 
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expense of general search users. Consumers undoubtedly prefer 
integrated search results. Even Google‟s competitors like Bing, 
assimilate specialized search results with the general search results. 
Hence, the author dismisses it as a non feasible measure. 
3.2.3. Continuous disclosure as remedy 
This category of remedy requires Google to reveal every minor 
change they make in their search algorithms. It is unfair to seek the 
aforementioned, from a company whose primary business operates 
on these very algorithms. If implemented, this would result in a 
clear case of overreaching transparency requirement. Google, by 
releasing transparency reports49 already does justice in regard to 
transparency, and coercion to further disclose all the minor 
adjustments made, will be similar to encouraging spamming, 
resulting in frustrated consumers. The impracticality of the 
aforementioned remedies removes them from the scope of 
implementation. This necessitates the need for a solution, which 
will efficaciously address the problems posed by search engine 
bias. The next part of the paper comprises of a discourse on the 
scope of „commitments or settlement‟ as an effective remedy in the 
New Economy, with the Indian landscape being the focal point of 
discussion.      
3.2.4. Analysis 
Remedies such as search neutrality and continuous disclosure, 
threaten competition as well as consumer welfare, by impeding 
innovation, merely to benefit the competitors of Google. This is a 
case of competitors concocting to alleviate themselves, by 
weakening Google as a competitor and harming consumers and 
competition as a result.50Equitable remedies for monopolization 
have three goals: to terminate a defendant‟s unlawful conduct, to 
prevent that conduct‟s recurrence, and to re-establish the 
opportunity for competition.51 The challenge lies in selecting a 
remedy that furthers these goals „without imposing undue costs on 
                                                          
49 Google Transparency Report, https://transparencyreport.google.com/ 
(last accessed on April 18, 2018).  
50Id. 
51 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001). * 
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the court or the parties, without unnecessarily chilling legitimate 
competition, and without undermining incentives to invest and 
innovate52.  
Competition authorities need to resolve the matters expeditiously. 
The Supreme Court of India very well realized the importance of 
time factor when it stated “In the event of delay, the very purpose 
and object of the Act is likely to be frustrated and the possibility of 
great damage to the open market and resultantly, country‟s 
economy cannot be ruled out.”53 Internet businesses expand and 
flourish at a pace faster than traditional sectors. In order to make an 
impact, authorities have a small frame of time before network 
effects set in. This warrants for the urgent requirement of a robust 
and time bound system by antitrust authorities that can ensure that 
their findings remain relevant in the light of the fast moving 
markets. By the time the Commission reaches a concluding remark, 
the company in question may already have lost its dominant 
position, or the complainant may no longer exist. Further, owing to 
the intricate nature of the search industry from a technological 
viewpoint, the Commission requires complex technical analysis 
from industry specialists, which inflate the period and cost of 
proceedings.  
The length and controversial nature of the Microsoft cases in the 
USA, involving a series of investigations concerning the issue of 
monopolization of market for personal computer operating 
systems, and the EU, concerning the abuse of dominant position, 
by Microsoft, as a supplier of operating systems for personal 
computers, affirm this position and opens a discourse for 
                                                          
52 US Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-firm Conduct 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (September, 2008), https:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-
under-section-2-sherman-act (last accessed on April 20, 2018). 
53 Competition Commission Of India vs Steel Authority Of India &Anr, 
(2010) Comp LR 0061; See also Namrata Marketing Pvt. Ltd. vs 
Competition Commission Of India, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 42783 of 
2013. 
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alternative approaches in dealing with competition problems in 
high tech markets.54 
In this regard, the suggested scheme is that of accepting 
commitment decisions from firms and businesses that are under 
antitrust scrutiny, or have been found to be engaging in illicit 
practices. Commitments can help achieve effective and expeditious 
relief from anticompetitive conduct, without both the authority and 
the party incurring costs of delay and litigation. Such a mechanism 
is already in operation by the European Commission (EC) and FTC 
(Federal Trade Commission).EC has a practice of accepting 
commitments from firms without the need of a full-fledged 
investigation.55 Likewise, FTC and the Department of Justice accept 
consent agreements. These settlements have halted unlawful 
conduct and prevented their recurrence in many matters, over the 
decades, in the U.S.56 Moreover, commitments are legally binding 
and attract penalty in case of violation. 
In the context of wide use of commitments and settlements as 
remedial mechanisms, India is yet to recognize commitments as 
part of the antitrust enforcement matrix. Tamil Nadu Film Exhibitors 
Association v. CCI & Ors.57clarified that the discretion given to CCI 
allows it to accept settlements as appropriate remedy for 
anticompetitive conduct.58The Madras High Court addressed the 
issue as to whether two adversaries could reach a settlement 
between themselves and thereby preclude the investigation 
initiated by CCI. It was ruled that settling disputes by 
commitments was within the scope of the Act, owing to the 
residuary powers vested with CCI to pass such orders or issue 
                                                          
54See Richard A. Posner, 'Antitrust in the New Economy' John M. Olin 
Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 106, 9 (2000). 
55Antitrust Regulation 1/2003, Article 9(1). 
56 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition 
Committee, Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases –Note by United States 
(June 02, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/873491/download (last 
accessed on April 17, 2018) 
57 M/S. Crown Theatre vs Kerala Film Exhibitors, Case No. 16 of 2014.  
58§27(g),The Competition Act, 2002, Act No. 12 of 2003, Acts of Parliament, 
2002 (India)   
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directions as it may deem fit.59 The judgment went on to rule three 
pre-conditions that CCI must be satisfied of, before accepting any 
commitment. First, such a settlement should not lead to 
continuance of anti-competitive practices, second, it should not 
allow an abuse of dominance to continue and third, it should not be 
prejudiced to consumer interests of freedom of trade. This 
judgment is commendable with regard to the masses privy to the 
Indian competition landscape. 
4. Conclusion 
The CCI ruling on Google will have a series of effects on the 
development of Competition law in India. The present paper has 
summarized the position taken by CCI in tackling the digital 
economy‟s elemental features, when confronting a technology 
giant. The impact of network effects, technology lock-in and the 
speed with which a dominant player can take control of a sector, 
call for earlier regulatory intervention in technology markets.60   
Relying on ex post facto and drawn out court battles, is not the 
approach to be adopted when regulating New Economy. 
Schumpeterian ideology of non-intervention surmises the presence 
of budding innovative startups, waiting to overhaul the market. 
However, in reality, people today are innovating solely with the 
aim of being acquired by existing major market players, as a cash-
out option. Selling one‟s smaller company to established big firms, 
rather than competing as independent companies, has become 
prevalent. Dethroning incumbents in technology markets is trickier 
and more complex than in traditional markets. Hence, the need of 
the hour is an ahead of time ex-ante intervention by regulators to 
displace a powerful company like Google.  This necessitates, the 
paper argues, the need for CCI to nip in the bud, the businesses 
that are on the path to imminent dominance. Therefore, the CCI‟s 
role should not be limited to an ex-post facto scrutiny of abuse of 
dominance. Competition standards for the new economy should, 
                                                          
59Id. 
60SeeJonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent 
the Problem that It Can't Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1361-62 
(1999). 
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instead, allow the CCI to prevent the harm, before it is done, by 
including a standard to review the abusive market conduct of 
firms, which are in a position of imminent dominance. If not, the 
result will be akin to the ingrained hegemony that Google was able 
to establish, while antitrust overseers lay passive. Therefore, the 
researcher suggests a shift in approach toexamining the means 
through which a firm sets „on the path of imminent dominance‟. In 
other words, the author recommends to fix the threshold at „abuse 
to dominate‟ instead of „abuse of dominance‟ for penalizing 
enterprises which resort to anti-competitive conduct to gain a 
dominant position in digital market. 
Regarding the fate of commitments or settlement as mechanisms of 
resolving antitrust issues, the High Court ruling has a coming-of-
age effect on Indian Competition schema. However, the fact that 
the High Court decision dealt with „inter-party settlement‟ i.e. 
settlement between the informant and the alleged party, must be 
accounted for, before venturing ahead with this proposal. The 
Court was silent as far as the issue of „commitments being made to 
CCI‟ is concerned. Additionally, the wide discretion given to CCI 
under Section 27 comes into play, when CCI has arrived at a 
finding of contravention. Whether CCI can accept a settlement at a 
stage where it has not yet reached a finding of contravention is 
unclear. The paper encourages adoption of a voluntary settlement 
scheme that will allow a business that is under investigation to 
voluntarily alter its market behavior, without the need for a 
conclusive finding of violation by the CCI. 
The CCI judgment has been well received by Indian vertical search 
engines. CCI has exhibited utmost awareness in departing from the 
traditional approach of evaluating markets and applying a nuanced 
approach to competition law‟s interaction with digital economy. 
The judgment resonates a sense of sound competition policy for 
ongoing competition, investment and innovation that will benefit 
all players. The author is of the opinion that CCI has stricken a 
balance between too rigid an antitrust policy and an excessively 
liberal antitrust policy. Further, the CCI's approach highlights its 
confidence, and indigenous attitude in dealing with innovative 
technology markets. The Indian competition regime is constantly 
evolving and has only recently begunto face unconventional 
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concerns such as the one presented in the paper.  The methods 
employed by CCI havesufficiently addressed the Google 
conundrum and instilled a sense of confidence in the concerned 
populace regarding the future of the Indian competition regime.  
